Denial of Recovery to Nonresident Beneficiaries Under Washington\u27s Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes: Is it Really Cheaper to Kill a Man than to Maim Him? by James, Jonathan
COMMENTS
Denial of Recovery to Nonresident Beneficiaries Under
Washington's Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes:
Is it Really Cheaper to Kill a Man than to Maim Him?
Jonathan Jamest
One who is financially dependent upon another should not lose both
life support and legal remedy in one tortious moment.'
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than sixty years, Dean William Prosser has noted in his
treatise on tort law that "it's cheaper to kill a man than to maim him." 2
This old adage has been repeated many times over the years in both law
review articles and court decisions involving wrongful death actions. 3
The story behind this maxim begins almost 200 years ago, when an Eng-
lish court decided that a civil action could not be brought for the wrong-
ful death of another.4 In other words, while a person tortiously injured by
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1. Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765, 776, 987 P.2d 127, 132 (1999) (Ellington, J., concurring).
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 945 (5th ed. 1984).
For an earlier version of this quote, see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 955 (1941) ("The result was that it was more profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff
than to scratch him.").
3. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970); Greene v.
Texeira, 505 P.2d 1169, 1178 (Haw. 1973); Miller v. Bath Elevator Co., 97 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich.
1959); Craig S. Bonnell, Back and Forth with the I.R.S.: The Taxation of Wrongful Death Actions in
Alabama, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 53, 69 (1986); Melanie T. Hewell, Comment, Extending the Applica-
tion of the Discovery Rule to Wrongful Death Actions: Where Will Texas Draw the Line?, 38
BAYLOR L. REV. 151 (1986).
4. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 29:663
another could bring a civil action against the tortfeasor, if that person
was killed, his loved ones would have no recourse and the defendant
would escape all civil liability, making it cheaper for the tortfeasor to kill
the person than merely to injure him. Supreme Court Justice Harlan
noted that such a rule has been described as "barbarous. 5 Other courts
have referred to it as "monstrous" and an "ancient obscenity."6 Unfortu-
nately, Dean Prosser's maxim is still true in the early years of the twenty-
first century in Washington.7 Currently, five separate Washington stat-
utes deal with tortious death.8 These statutes encompass causes of action
for the decedent's surviving family and also preserve the decedent's own
cause of action for personal injury and death. The latter situation is cov-
ered by the two survival statutes.9
Because wrongful death law in Washington is purely statutory,10
the legislature is at liberty to determine who can and who cannot recover
for the wrongful death of a loved one. Such legislative control in this
area has been upheld by the Washington courts. 1
In the earliest days, only a widow or her children were allowed to
recover. Over the years, however, the legislature has recognized and
5. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 381-82 ("Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of
which are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a
violation should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to cause death. On the con-
trary, that rule has been criticized ever since its inception, and described in such terms as 'barba-
rous.').
6. Miller v. Bath Elevator Co., 97 N.W.2d 792, 793 (Mich. 1959).
It was inevitable that a doctrine so monstrous, its origins so obscure and puzzling, should
receive legislative amelioration and such has been the case. Even with relation to work-
men's compensation, which is in no respects a damage remedy, it is provided by statute
that compensation for an industrial injury shall not be interred with the body. Yet, despite
the express mandate of an enlightened public conscience, clearly stated in the compensa-
tion act itself, we are besought to read this provision out of the act by a process ofjudicial
interpretation. We are invited to engraft this grotesque stalk of the common law, long dis-
credited and unlamented, upon one of the great remedial acts of our times, thus infusing
the ancient obscenity with new life and vigor. This we cannot do.
Id.
7. This assertion is contrary to the view of the Washington State Supreme Court as recently as
June 2004. In a case challenging the state survival statutes, the decedent's estate argued that recov-
ery of damages for the decedent's loss of enjoyment of life should be recoverable under those stat-
utes. Otani v. Broudy, 151 Wash. 2d 750, 757, 92 P.3d 192, 198 (2004). The estate contended that
under the current statutes, it was cheaper for a tortfeasor to kill a person than to harm him. Id. at 762,
92 P.3d at 198. In finding that loss of enjoyment of life was not recoverable under the survival stat-
utes, the court stated "[t]hus, it is not cheaper for a defendant to kill, instead of injure, another person
in Washington." Id. at 763, 92 P.3d at 198.
8. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010, .020, .046, .060 (2004); Id. § 4.24.010 (2004).
9. Id. §§ 4.20.046, .060 (2004).
10. Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765, 771, 987 P.2d 127, 130 (1999) ("But as the courts of this
state have long and repeatedly held, causes of action for wrongful death are strictly a matter of legis-
lative grace and are not recognized in the common law.").
I1. Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 390, 88 P.3d 939, 946 (2004).
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added other beneficiaries to the wrongful death and survival statutes, in-
cluding dependent parents and siblings.' 2 These changes are consistent
with the purpose of such statutes, which is to compensate members of the
decedent's family who have been denied the support or assistance that
they expected to receive from the decedent had he or she remained liv-
ing.' 3
Legislative designations of who qualifies as a "beneficiary" for the
purpose of wrongful death and survival statutes are typically based on
the category of family member. For instance, statutes in other states have
allowed recovery by dependent siblings, step-children, or illegitimate
children.' 4 In Washington, however, the legislature has taken a more re-
strictive view and determined that only a specific subset of dependent
parents and siblings should be allowed to recover.' 5 Thus, recovery under
the Washington wrongful death and survival statutes is only available to
qualifying dependent parents and siblings who reside within the United
States at the time of the death of their loved one.16 The only exception is
the child-death statute, which allows dependent parents to bring a wrong-
ful death claim irrespective of residency.' 7
Several hypothetical situations illustrate the issue. If a person resid-
ing in Washington is simply injured by a tortfeasor, the victim would not
be statutorily prohibited from bringing a civil action for personal injury,
irrespective of whether that person is a United States citizen. If, however,
the person is killed by the tortfeasor, and the victim's dependent parents
happened to live just across the border in Vancouver, they would only be
able to recover under the child-death statute, again, irrespective of their
citizenship. If those same parents happened to reside in Florida, they
would be entitled to recovery under all of the Washington wrongful
death and survival statutes, even if they were foreign citizens. Finally,
dependent siblings who do not reside within the United States are pre-
cluded from recovery under all the statutes.
Inherent in wrongful death statutes is the idea that not all relatives
of the decedent should be compensated for their loss. 18 However, decid-
12. See 1909 Wash. Sess. Laws 425.
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 947 (5th ed.
1984).
14. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3721 (2005) (definition of child for wrongful death
actions includes illegitimate child); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020 (2004) (allowing for recovery by step-
child).
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (2004).
16. Id.
17.Id. § 4.24.010 (2004).
18. See Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765, 771-72, 987 P.2d 127, 130 (1999) (the purpose of
wrongful death statutes is to compensate those who might naturally have expected assistance from
the deceased).
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ing that some dependent parents and siblings should be excluded from
recovery solely based upon their foreign residency while allowing recov-
ery for other dependent parents and siblings, who reside within the
United States, is discriminatory on its face. Even though the wrongful
death statutes make legitimate distinctions between beneficiaries based
upon dependency or the category of relationship to the decedent (e.g.
siblings, grandparents, nephews, etc.), "what difference can it make
where they may reside? It is the fact of their relation to the life destroyed
that is the circumstance to be considered . .. 9
Although courts have expressed repugnance for discrimination
against nonresidents as far back as the early 1900s and recognized that it
was out of date even in their time, it is the refusal of Washington courts
to question the constitutionality of such legislative enactments which has
allowed this injustice to continue unabated for almost 100 years. It is
time that the courts in Washington finally realize that such discrimina-
tory legislation must succumb to the protections provided by both the
United States and Washington Constitutions and find these statutes un-
constitutional. To do otherwise would allow a tortfeasor an "undeserved
and morbid windfall ''20 should his tortious act result in death instead of
injury.
Part II of this Comment will briefly discuss the historical roots of
wrongful death and survival statutes from their origin in England, the
resulting lack of a common law cause of action, and the current Wash-
ington statutes. Part II concludes with a discussion of treatment of non-
resident beneficiaries under various wrongful death and survival statutes.
Part III applies the rational basis constitutional review adopted by the
Washington State Supreme Court. In Part IV, this Comment concludes
that, under the rational basis test and pertinent Washington case law, the
Washington statutes are unconstitutional.
II. THE HISTORY OF WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL STATUTES
A. The Origins of Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes
Today, all fifty states have statutes that allow for wrongful death or
survival actions.21 In most cases, however, this statutory cause of action
19. Bridget & McGovern v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 389, 400 (1914).
20. Steve Andrews, Comment, Survivability of Noneconomic Damages for Tortious Death in
Washington, 21 SEATFLE U. L. REV. 625, 651 (1998).
21. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY 35-36 (3d ed. 1992) ("At the
present time there are statutes in all American states that create a right to recover for wrongful
death.").
[Vol. 29:663
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is not accompanied by a recognized common law cause of action.22 The
lack of a common law recovery for wrongful death has a long history,
and has its origins in the 1808 English case of Baker v. Bolton.23 In that
case, Lord Ellenborough instructed the jury that "in civil court, the death
of a human being could not be complained of as an injury.' 2 Almost
forty years later, this common law rule was effectively overturned by the
British Parliament with the passage in 1846 of Lord Campbell's Act, the
preamble of which created a civil cause of action for deaths which would
otherwise be felonies under criminal law. 25
In general, Lord Campbell's Act created a class of statutorily de-
fined beneficiaries who could recover for losses caused by the wrongful
death of a relative.26 The creation of a new statutory cause of action for
wrongful death under Lord Campbell's Act became the basic model for
the various state statutes which were subsequently adopted in the United
States, 27 including in the State of Washington.28
Although a statutory recovery for wrongful death has reached all
corners of our country, the old rule of Baker, which rejected the notion of
recovery for wrongful death under the common law, continues to per-
sist.29 In essence, various state courts in the United States, including
Washington, adhere to a general common law rule, which holds that in
the absence of a statute, no recovery for wrongful death is allowed.3 °
B. Washington State Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes
The complexity of the Washington wrongful death and survival
statutes has long attracted the attention of both lawyers and scholars in
the state.31 Part of the complexity stems from the fact that wrongful death
cases are entirely statutory in nature, since Washington has followed the
general practice of adopting the example of Lord Campbell's Act.32 In
addition, Washington courts have repeatedly rejected the idea of a com-
22. William S. Bailey, Flawed Justice: Limitation of Parental Remedies for the Loss of Con-
sortium ofAdult Children, 27 SEATFLE U. L. REv. 941, 952 (2004).
23. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
24. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 383 (1970) (citing Baker, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1033).
25. Bailey, supra note 22, at 951.
26. SPEISER, supra note 21, § 1:8.
27. Id. § 1:9.
28. Griffin v. Gehret, 17 Wash. App. 546, 550, 564 P.2d 332, 334-35 (1977).
29. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 384.
30. See Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 390, 88 P.3d 939, 946 (2004); LaFage v.
Jani, 766 A.2d 1066, 1076 (N.J. 2001).
31. Andrews, supra note 20, at 625.
32. 16 Wash. Practice, Tort Law and Practice § 6.1 (2005).
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mon law claim for wrongful death and have affirmed that such actions
are purely within the province of the legislature.33
In Washington, five separate statutes govern wrongful death and
survival actions.34 The wrongful death statutes, codified at title 4, chapter
33. Philippides, 151 Wash. 2d at 390, 88 P.3d at 946 (2004); Anderson v. Seattle, 78 Wash. 2d
201, 202, 471 P.2d 87, 88 (1970); Windust v. Dep't. of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash. 2d 33, 36, 323
P.2d 241, 243 (1958); Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765, 771,987 P.2d 127, 130 (1999).
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 (2004) provides:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another
his personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the person caus-
ing the death; and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount, in law, to a felony.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (2004) provides:
Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, child or children, includ-
ing stepchildren, of the person whose death shall have been so caused. If there be no wife
or husband or such child or children, such action may be maintained for the benefit of the
parents, sisters or brothers, who may be dependent upon the deceased person for support,
and who are resident within the United States at the time of his death.
In every such action the jury may give such damages as, under all circumstances of
the case, may to them seem just.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (2004) provides:
(1) All causes of action by a person or persons against another person or persons shall
survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the personal representa-
tives of the latter, whether such actions arise on contract or otherwise, and whether or not
such actions would have survived at the common law or prior to the date of enactment of
this section: Provided, however, That the personal representative shall only be entitled to
recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation per-
sonal to and suffered by a deceased on behalf of those beneficiaries enumerated in RCW
4.20.020, and such damages are recoverable regardless of whether or not the death was
occasioned by the injury that is the basis for the action. The liability of property of a hus-
band and wife held by them as community property to execution in satisfaction of a claim
enforceable against such property so held shall not be affected by the death of either or
both spouses; and a cause of action shall remain an asset as though both claiming spouses
continued to live despite the death of either or both claiming spouses.
(2) Where death or an injury to person or property, resulting from a wrongful act, neglect
or default, occurs simultaneously with or after the death of a person who would have
been liable therefore if his death had not occurred simultaneously with such death or in-
jury or had not intervened between the wrongful act, neglect or default and the resulting
death or injury, an action to recover damages for such death or injury may be maintained
against the personal representative of such person.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.060 (2004) provides:
No action for a personal injury to any person occasioning death shall abate, nor shall such
right of action determine, by reason of such death, if such person has a surviving spouse
or child living, including stepchildren, or leaving no surviving spouse or such children, if
there is dependent upon the deceased for support and resident within the United States at
the time of decedent's death, parents, sisters or brothers; but such action may be prose-
cuted, or commenced and prosecuted, by the executor or administrator of the deceased, in
favor of such surviving spouse, or in favor of the surviving spouse and such children, or
if no surviving spouse, in favor of such child or children, or if no surviving spouse or
such child or children, then in favor of the decedent's parents, sisters or brothers who
may be dependent upon such person for support, and resident in the United States at the
time of decedent's death.
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20, sections 010 and 020 of the Revised Code of Washington, create a
cause of action for the statutorily defined classes of beneficiaries of the
decedent, whose death was caused by the wrongful or negligent act of
another.35 Similarly, title 4, chapter 24, section 010, the so-called "child-
death statute, 36 gives parents a cause of action for the death of a minor
child or a child upon whom the parents are financially dependent for
support.37 In contrast, the two survival statutes, title 4, chapter 20, sec-
tions 046 and 060 of the Revised Code, preserve any cause of action that
the decedent may have had against the wrongdoer for pre-death injuries,
and therefore do not create new causes of action for the beneficiaries.38
1. General Wrongful Death Statutes
Title 4, chapter 20, sections 010 and 020 of the Revised Code is the
general wrongful death statute in Washington. Under this statute, the per-
sonal representative of the deceased, plaintiff in name only, can bring an
action for the benefit of the statutorily defined beneficiaries as specified
in the statute, which states that
[elvery such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband,
child or children, including stepchildren, of the person whose
death shall have been so caused. If there be no wife or husband
or such child or children, such action may be maintained for the
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (2004) provides:
A mother or father, or both, who has regularly contributed to the support of his or her mi-
nor child, and the mother or father, or both, of a child on whom either, or both, are de-
pendent for support may maintain or join as a party an action as plaintiff for the injury or
death of the child.
This section creates only one cause of action, but if the parents of the child are not
married, are separated, or not married to each other damages may be awarded to each
plaintiff separately, as the trier of fact finds just and equitable.
If one parent brings an action under this section and the other parent is not named as a
plaintiff, notice of the institution of the suit, together with a copy of the complaint, shall
be served upon the other parent: PROVIDED, That notice shall be required only if par-
entage has been duly established.
Such notice shall be in compliance with the statutory requirements for a summons.
Such notice shall state that the other parent must join as a party to the suit within twenty
days or the right to recover damages under this section shall be barred. Failure of the
other parent to timely appear shall bar such parent's action to recover any part of an
award made to the party instituting the suit.
In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication expenses,
and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for the loss of love and
companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relation-
ship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.
35. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.010, .020 (2004).
36. Masunaga v. Gapasin, 57 Wash. App. 624, 625-26, 790 P.2d 171, 173 (1990).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (2004).
38. Otani ex rel. Shigaki v. Broudy, 151 Wash. 2d 750, 755, 92 P.3d 192, 194-95 (2004).
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benefit of the parents, sisters or brothers, who may be dependent
upon the deceased person for support, and who are resident
within the United States at the time of his death.39
While the wrongful death statute has undergone a few changes
since it was first enacted in 1854,40 the most significant change, at least
from the point of view of this author, was the amendment by the legisla-
ture in 1909. During this session, the legislature expanded the class of
beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute to include recovery by de-
pendent parents and siblings (at the time, "siblings" only included sisters
and minor brothers). It also added language limiting recovery in this new
category of beneficiaries to those who were residents in the United States
at the time of the decedent's death. 41 As noted, this particular language
persists to this day.
In its current form, section 020 is considered to have created two
classes of beneficiaries. 42 The beneficiaries in the first class, who are en-
titled to recover without a showing of financial dependency, consist of
spouses or children of the decedent.43 Beneficiaries in the second class,
who may recover in the absence of a beneficiary from the first class, are
made up of parents or siblings who were dependent upon the decedent
for support.4 4 However, the legislature further divided the second class
by restricting recovery to only those financially dependent siblings or
parents who are "resident within the United States at the time of [the de-
cedent's] death., 45 It is clear that the residency requirement only applies
to the second class of beneficiaries--dependent siblings and parents-
and not to spouses or children.46 Because no significant legislative his-
tory is availahle for the 1909 legislative session, we are left to speculate
about the reasons for the inclusion of such language. Part III of this arti-
cle will explore possible explanations for the legislature's actions.
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (2004) (emphasis added).
40. Andrews, supra note 20, at 628.
41. See 1909 Wash. Laws, ch. 129, p. 425.
42. See Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 386, 88 P.3d 939, 944-45 (2004); Andrews,
supra note 20, at 629.
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020 (2004).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Although no cases have challenged the language of the statute on these grounds, it seems
clear from a plain language reading of the statute that the residency restriction only applies to non-
dependent parents and siblings and has no bearing on the recovery of children or spouses. The sen-
tence designating spouses and children as beneficiaries ends with a period. The next sentence, which
designates parents and siblings, included the residency restriction which is contained within the same
sentence, separated only by a comma. See full text of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020, supra note 34.
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2. Child-Death Statute
In addition to the general wrongful death statutes, Washington also
has what is known as the child-death statute.47 Title 4, chapter 24, section
010 of the Revised Code exclusively gives parents a statutory cause of
action for the death of a minor child or child upon whom the parents
were dependent.4 8 This statute is distinguished from chapter 20, section
010, in that it gives the parents a cause of action even if there are benefi-
ciaries from the first class of beneficiaries, spouses or children, under
chapter 20, section 020.4 9
The wrongful death and child-death statutes differ in at least two
ways. First, unlike the wrongful death statute, which requires that de-
pendent parents and siblings be United States residents at the time of
death, the child-death statute does not impose a residency requirement on
the parents.50 Second, qualifying parents may bring actions under both
the general wrongful death statute and the child's wrongful death statute,
although they may be required to elect available damages under the stat-
utes to avoid duplication. 5' The result is that while dependent parents
who reside in the United States can recover under both the child-death
statute and the general wrongful death statute, dependent parents residing
outside the United States may only recover under the child-death statute.
Discussion of this distinction will be addressed in further detail in Part
III.
3. Survival Statutes
Washington has a general survival statute as well as a special sur-
vival statute. Unlike the wrongful death statutes, which generally cover
post-death damages, the survival statutes preserve the decedent's causes
of action for pre-death injuries; they do not create a new cause of action
for the statutory beneficiaries.52 Under title 4, chapter 20, section 046 of
the Revised Code, the general survival statute, all causes of action that
the decedent could have brought are preserved for the benefit of the es-
tate.53 In general, this allows for the personal representative to recover
47. Masunaga v. Gapasin, 57 Wash. App. 624, 790 P.2d 171 (1990).
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010 (2004).
49. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020, the second class of beneficiaries (which includes
parents) is not entitled to recovery unless there are no beneficiaries from the first class (spouses or
children). In addition, like WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020, there is a requirement under chapter 24,
section 010 that the parents be dependent on the child for support. See supra note 34.
50. Id. § 4.24.010 (2004).
51. Andrews, supra note 20, at 630.
52. Otani ex rel. Shigaki v. Broudy 151 Wash. 2d 750, 755, 92 P.3d 192, 195 (2004); see also
Andrews, supra note 20 at 632.
53. Otani, 151 Wash. 2d at 755-56, 92 P.3d at 195.
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pain and suffering as well as other damages on behalf of the same bene-
ficiaries that are listed in the wrongful death statute. Under the special
survival statute, codified at chapter 20, section 060, only the personal
injury claims of the decedent are permitted and they are only for the
benefit of the statutory beneficiaries. 54 In theory, this differential treat-
ment is explained by the fact that an action under the special survival
statute is brought by the administrator of the decedent's estate while an
action under the general survival statute is brought by the decedent's per-
sonal representative. However, in practice, the executor of the estate and
the personal representative is often the same person acting in both
roles.55 Nevertheless, the beneficiaries under either survival action are
still limited by the categories established by the wrongful death statute.56
Therefore, as applied to dependent parents and siblings, only those who
reside in the United States at the time of the decedent's death are entitled
to recover under the survival statutes.
Despite the complexity and broad scope of Washington's five stat-
utes, they still allow a tortfeasor to escape liability if the victim dies and
only has beneficiaries who live outside the United States. Such differen-
tial treatment is not acceptable in this day and age and the courts should
strike down these statutes as unconstitutional.
C. Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes as Applied to Nonresidents
A basic premise of Lord Campbell's Act and its progeny in the
United States was that a wrongful death claim is for the exclusive benefit
of the statutorily defined beneficiaries.57 As noted above, the Washington
legislature has established two classes of beneficiaries under the wrong-
ful death and survival statutes.58 Unlike other states, Washington has
specifically excluded nonresident parents and siblings from recovery un-
der the wrongful death and survival statutes. 59 However, this was not
always the case. As of 1903, no state statutes either allowed or forbade
recovery by nonresident beneficiaries.60 Indeed, as of 1909, both the
Washington Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that nonresident aliens had a right of recovery under the Washington
54. Id. at 756, P.3d at 195.
55. Andrews, supra note 20, at 632 n.55.
56. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.20.046, .060 (2004) (although the language of WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.20.060 does not specifically refer to WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.020, the language regarding
the residency requirement is almost identical).
57. SPEISER, supra note 21, at § 10:1.
58. Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 385, 88 P.3d 939, 943-44 (2004).
59. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Also note that this does not apply to the child-
death statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010, which has no residency requirement.
60. Bonthron v. Phoenix Light & Fuel Co., 71 P. 941,942 (Ariz. 1903).
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statutes. 61 However, in that same year, the Washington legislature ex-
tended recovery under the wrongful death and survival statutes to de-
pendent parents and siblings and added the language "who are resident
within the United States at the time of his death. 62
Although the Washington statutes appear to apply equally to non-
resident citizens as well as nonresident aliens, some states have deter-
mined that in the absence of express language such as that in the Wash-
ington statutes, nonresident aliens may not recover at all for the wrongful
death of a relative.63 However, the case law in most states follows the
lead of Davidsson v. Hill,64 a 1901 English case which gave the nonresi-
dent alien mother of the decedent a cause of action for wrongful death.65
The court in Davidsson noted that:
it would seem to be rather a strange thing that the foreign national-
ity of the sufferer by another's negligence, which in no way preju-
dices his right of action here if he is only hurt and not killed, should
form, the circumstances being otherwise identical, an absolute bar
to any relief of the sufferer's family under these Acts. The Acts are
Acts the express object of which is to create a liability to an action
for damages at the suit of relatives who suffer from the death of the
66deceased person ....
Similar language has also been used by courts in the United States.67
Given that the original wrongful death statute in Washington did
not expressly create a residency requirement for dependent beneficiaries,
it is reasonable to conclude that the Washington legislature deliberately
added this language when they amended the statute in 1909. The absence
of case law from that time suggests that the legislature's actions were not
simply to affirm a prior version of a statute or to codify previous court
61. Anustasakas v. Int'l Contract Co., 51 Wash. 119, 123, 98 P. 93, 94 (1908); Saveljich v.
Lytle Logging & Mercantile Co., 173 F. 277 (9th Cir. 1909).
62. Mesher v. Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 443, 134 P. 1092, 1094 (1913). This change was subse-
quently acknowledged in Dobrin v. Mallory S.S. Co., 298 F. 349, 350 (D.C.N.Y. 1924) (although
this ruling is not binding in Washington State, this is the first case which recognized the addition of
the residency requirement to the wrongful death statute).
63. See, e.g., Maiorano v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 213 U.S. 268 (1909); Fulco v. Schuylkill
Stone Co., 163 F. 124 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1908), affd, 169 F. 98 (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1909).
64.2 K.B. 606 (1901).
65. SPEISER, supra note 21, at § 10:22.
66. Davidsson, 2 K.B. at 610.
67. See, e.g., Bonthron v. Phoenix Light & Fuel Co., 71 P. 941, 944 (Ariz. 1903).
The object of the [wrongful death] act is to extend beyond the limits of the common law
the right to recover reparation for a wrong, and we fail to see why, the wrong having been
committed, the same reparation should not be made, whether those entitled to it are citi-
zens of a state of our Union, or citizens of that country whose law were have inherited,
and whose legislation in this instance we have adopted.
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rulings. No matter its legislative purpose, this restriction on recovery by
nonresident dependents has survived unchanged by the legislature for
nearly 100 years. The time has come for the courts in Washington State
to recognize that the statutory limitation on recovery by nonresident de-
pendents is unconstitutional and should be overturned.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WASHINGTON STATE
WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVAL STATUTES
The Washington State wrongful death and survival statutes have
been attacked on many different fronts since their inception, including on
constitutional grounds.68 However, the courts have consistently found
that the legislature's identification of classes of beneficiaries is not sub-
ject to judicial review.69 In 1999, the Washington Court of Appeals re-
jected an equal protection challenge brought by a decedent's niece on the
grounds that she was not a statutory beneficiary under any of the State
wrongful death or survival statutes even though she was dependent on
the decedent for support and they shared a "parent-child like" relation-
ship.7°
As recently as 2004, the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its
reluctance to infringe on legislative decisions by rejecting an equal pro-
tection challenge to the dependency requirement of the child-death stat-
ute. 7' The court held that "the legislature has created a comprehensive set
of statutes governing who may recover for wrongful death and survival,
and there is no room for this court to act in that area." 72 The court further
emphasized that "the change the plaintiffs seek must come from the leg-
islature rather than this court. 73 However, the legislature appears un-
aware of the existence of such a discriminatory provision in the wrongful
death and survival statutes. Even though all of the statutes have been
amended many times since their creation in the mid-1800s, the amend-
ments have mostly concerned gender discrimination (at one point they
allowed recovery to widows and dependent sisters but not widowers and
dependent brothers) 74 or the dependency factor. 75 It seems that the subse-
68. See, e.g., Philippides, v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 88 P.3d 939 (2004); Masunaga v.
Gapasin, 57 Wash. App. 624, 790 P.2d 171 (1990).
69. See Philippides, 151 Wash. 2d at 390, 88 P.3d at 946; Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765,
769, 987 P.2d 127, 129 (1999).
70. Tait, 97 Wash. App. at 769-70, 987 P.2d at 129-30.
71. Codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.010. Philippides, 151 Wash. 2d at 391-92, 88 P.3d at
946-47.
72. Philippides, 151 Wash. 2d at 390, 88 P.3d at 946.
73. Id.
74. See Whittlesey v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 645, 651, 163 P. 193, 195 (1917).
75. See Masunaga v. Gapasin, 57 Wash. App. 624, 628, 790 P.2d 171, 173 (1990).
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quent legislatures have been indifferent to the residency requirement
added in 1909 and have just accepted it as such without any further con-
sideration. Although a constitutional challenge may be difficult, the leg-
islature's inability to remedy such discrimination necessitates a judicial
determination that these statutes violate the constitutional rights of the
excluded beneficiaries or even of the decedent.
A. Applying the Rational Basis Test
The strongest challenge to the Washington wrongful death and sur-
vival statutes is that they violate both the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution,76 which provides that no state shall deprive
any person of the equal protection of its laws, and the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Washington Constitution.77 The Washington privi-
leges and immunities clause provides that "[n]o law shall be passed
granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than mu-
nicipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not
equally belong to all citizens, or corporations. 78 This clause has been
interpreted by Washington courts as being "substantially identical" to the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.7 9 Although a
prospective plaintiff might argue that article 1, section 12 of the Wash-
ington State Constitution affords additional protections above and be-
yond those in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, 80 this Comment will focus on and engage in the same analysis used
in recent years by the Washington courts when addressing constitutional
challenges to the wrongful death and survival statutes.8 1
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
77. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
78. Id.
79. State v. Shawn P., 122 Wash. 553, 559-60, 859 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1993).
We have held that the right to equal protection under the law guaranteed by the U.S.
Const. amend. 14, § I and by the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington
Const. art. 1, § 12 are substantially identical. Both require that persons similarly situated
with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law be similarly treated.
Id.
80. The Washington Supreme Court has, in some cases, analyzed article 1, section 12 inde-
pendently from the Fourteenth Amendment using the so-called Gunwall factors. See Grant County
Fire Prot. Dist. No. 5, 150 Wash. 2d 791, 805-06, 83 P.3d 419, 425 (2004). In addition, a prospec-
tive plaintiff might also bring a case in federal court. However, the scope of this Comment is limited
to reviewing the test applied by the Washington courts, and as such, will not address a possible ra-
tional basis review by the federal courts.
81. The Washington courts have found the equal protection clause and the privileges and im-
munities clause as being substantially similar when analyzing constitutional challenges. See supra,
note 79. This approach has been followed by the Washington courts in recent years when analyzing
challenges to the wrongful death and survival statutes. See Philippides, v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d
376, 391, 88 P.3d 939, 946 (2004); Masunaga v. Gapasin, 57 Wash. App. 624, 632, 790 P.2d 171,
175-76 (1990).
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Furthermore, any constitutional challenges to these statutes by non-
resident dependent beneficiaries will be analyzed by a Washington court
using a rational basis framework. When a statute is challenged as a viola-
tion of equal protection, the courts will use one of three different legal
standards for determining whether the violation alleged by the plaintiff
exists: "strict scrutiny," "intermediate" or "heightened scrutiny," or "ra-
tional basis. 82 The higher degrees of scrutiny, "strict" and "intermedi-
ate," are typically applied when a government classification affects a
fundamental or important right or a suspect or semi-suspect class. 83
However, the sub-classification of second tier beneficiaries in the wrong-
ful death and survival statutes is based upon residency, not upon
alienage, citizenship, or some other intrinsic classification that the courts
have found to be a suspect class. 84 Therefore, a court addressing a chal-
lenge on these grounds will likely apply a rational basis analysis.
In Washington, the courts have adopted a three-part test for deter-
mining whether a statute challenged on equal protection grounds sur-
vives the rational basis test.85 The court asks the following: (1) does the
classification apply alike to all members within the designated class; (2)
do reasonable grounds exist to support a distinction between those within
and without each class; and (3) does the class have a "rational relation-
ship" to the purpose of the legislation? 86 In sum, a person challenging
these statutes in a Washington State court on equal protection grounds 87
must first show that persons similarly situated with respect to the legiti-
mate purpose of the law do not receive like treatment. 88 The burden is
then on the party challenging the statute(s) to show that the law is irrele-
vant to maintaining a state objective or that an arbitrary classification has
been created.89
1. Not All Class Members are Treated Alike
With respect to the first prong of the rational basis test, courts have
consistently held that the wrongful death and survival statutes are limited
82. Fusato v. Wash. Interscholastic Activities Ass'n., 93 Wash. App. 762, 767, 970 P.2d 774,
777 (1999).
83. Id.
84. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1979).
85. Fusato, 93 Wash. App. at 767, 970 P.2d at 777.
86. Harris v. Dept. of Labor and Indus., 120 Wash. 2d 461, 477-78, 843 P.2d 1056,
1065 (1993).
87. For purposes of this Comment, "equal protection" refers to a challenge brought under both
the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the privileges and immunities
clause of the Washington State Constitution.
88. State v. Simmons, 152 Wash. 2d. 450, 458, 98 P.3d 789, 793 (2004).
89. Id.
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to two tiers of beneficiaries. 90 The first tier consists of spouses and chil-
dren while the second consists of parents and siblings who are dependent
on the decedent for support. However, the second designated class, de-
pendent parents and siblings, does not treat all members alike, because
those who are not resident in the United States at the time of death are
expressly excluded from recovery. Because these statutes create a sub-
classification based upon the residency of the dependent beneficiary,
both nonresident United States citizens and nonresident aliens are af-
fected. Additionally, unlike resident aliens, nonresident aliens are faced
with the problem that they are not protected by the United States Consti-
tution9l and are not entitled to any recovery unless expressly provided for
by statute.
As such, nonresident alien beneficiaries must argue that the consti-
tutional rights affected are those of the decedent, and not those of the
nonresident beneficiary him or herself. Under this theory, nonresident
alien beneficiaries can challenge the survival statutes by arguing that de-
nying recovery to the nonresident alien dependent beneficiaries actually
infringes on the constitutional rights of the decedent because these causes
of action are derivative of the decedent's cause of action. This argument
will be explored in further detail in Part III.B.
2. There is No Reasonable Basis for Distinguishing
Between Residents and Nonresidents
The second prong of the rational basis test asks whether reasonable
grounds exist to support a distinction between those inside and outside
each class. Under this prong of the test, there must be a reasonable basis
for distinguishing between resident dependent beneficiaries and nonresi-
dent dependent beneficiaries. Unlike a strict scrutiny analysis, the ra-
tional basis test places a heavy burden on the challenger to show the un-
reasonableness of the classification. 92 Thus, a statute will be presumed to
be constitutional "if at all possible., 93
90. See Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 383-86, 88 P.3d 939, 943-44 (2004); Tait v.
Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765, 769, 987 P.2d 127, 129 (1999); Masunaga v. Gapasin, 57 Wash. App.
624, 629, 790 P.2d 171, 174 (1990).
91. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (the majority opinion pointed out that
"in extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out
that it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to
act.").
92. See Philippides, 151 Wash. 2d at 391, 88 P.3d at 946-47.
93. Id. at 391, 88 P.3d at 946.
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a. Historical Rationales
There is no legislative history that explains the rationale for deny-
ing recovery to nonresident dependent beneficiaries. In the absence of
legislative history, we must look instead at some general reasons which
have been cited historically.9 4 One reason was noted 100 years ago by a
New York court that was considering whether to allow recovery by non-
resident aliens for wrongful death.9 5 In that case, the defendant argued
that the dependency requirement in the wrongful death statute was in-
tended to prevent "pauperism" in the state, and that in the case of non-
resident alien dependents this would not be a legislative concern, since
they would become paupers elsewhere.9 6 The New York court dispensed
of this argument by holding that, since a parent may recover for the death
of an infant child, dependence could not be the main purpose of the stat-
ute.97
As noted above, dependence is an important purpose in classifying
beneficiaries under the Washington wrongful death and survival statutes.
However, the prevention of "pauperism" in Washington does not require
distinction between residents of other states and those who reside outside
of the United States. Since Washington State would only be responsible
for providing welfare benefits for those within its territory, it should not
matter whether the nonresident beneficiary resides in Vancouver, Can-
ada, or 3000 miles away in Florida. The "prevention of pauperism" is not
a valid justification for allowing recovery for U.S. citizens in other states,
but not U.S. citizens in other countries.
An additional argument supporting the current statutes is that a
country's laws are without any force and effect beyond its territorial ju-
risdiction and limits.98 This argument is premised on the idea that a coun-
try, or in this case a state, cannot reach outside its boundaries to confer
rights and/or impose liabilities upon aliens. This argument was convinc-
ingly dealt with by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway. Co. v. Naylor.99 Here, the court
noted that such actions are brought on behalf of the beneficiaries by ap-
pointed administrators who were just as likely to be residents and citi-
94. 22A AM. JUR. 2D DEATH §107 (1988).
95. Tanas v. Mun. Gas Co. of City of Albany, 88 A.D. 251, 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1903).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 22A AM. JUR. 2D DEATH §107 (1988). An additional argument put forth is that if the legis-
lature had intended for nonresident aliens and citizens to recover, it would have put this in the stat-
ute. Id. This argument was intended to address statutes which did not provide one way or the other
for nonresident dependents. In the case of Washington State, the legislature has specifically pre-
cluded nonresident parents and siblings from recovery.
99. 76 N.E. 505 (Ohio 1905).
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zens of Ohio as citizens of another country.' 00 In addition, the claims of
the beneficiaries were brought into the courts of Ohio to be determined
by Ohio law. 10 1 As the court put it, "it is not a question of territorial ju-
risdiction . . . it is merely a question of construction of the statute to de-
termine whether [the alleged beneficiary] is excluded from its bene-
fits.' 0 2 Moreover, given that the Washington statute has already reached
across borders specifically to exclude nonresident aliens from protection
under its law, this argument is without merit and does not provide a ra-
tional basis for discriminating between residents and nonresident de-
pendants.
Applying these arguments to the Washington statutes is problematic
because the statutes did not expressly prohibit recovery by nonresident
aliens. Instead, these courts were asked to decide whether wrongful death
statutes should be interpreted to include nonresident aliens where the
statutes were silent on this issue. However, given the lack of legislative
history for the inclusion of the residency requirement in the Washington
statutes, these contemporary cases-all written around the same time
period, 1909, in which the language was added to the Washington stat-
ute--offer the best insight available into the justifications for excluding
nonresident dependents from recovery under the Washington statutes.10 3
b. Possible Race-Based Motivations
The lack of legislative history and case law on this issue leads this
author to speculate on the legislature's rationale for excluding nonresi-
dent dependants from recovery. There is some evidence, albeit inconclu-
sive, that there may have been racial overtones to the creation of the ex-
clusionary provision in the statutes.
In 1911, the Washington State Legislature passed a joint memorial
which stated, among other things, that more than one million aliens came
to the United States between July 1909 and June 1910, of which over
600,000 came from "southern and eastern Europe and western Asia, the
most undesirable immigrants known .... [T]he effect of this alien del-
uge is to depress the wages and destroy the employment of thousands of
American workingmen .... "104 This resolution requested that the United
States Congress pass legislation restricting the "influx of the most unde-
100. Id. at 506.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Similar justifications exist for denying workers' compensation death benefits to nonresi-
dent alien beneficiaries. See Adam S. Hersh, Comment, Go Home, Stranger: An Analysis of Unequal
Workers' Compensation Death Benefits to Nonresident Alien Beneficiaries, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
217,219-20 (1994).
104. See 1911 Wash. Sess. Laws, House Joint Memorial No. 2, p. 666.
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sirable foreigners whose presence tends to destroy American standards of
living."'1 5 Whether this racial animus was behind the change in the
wrongful death and survival statutes at issue here will likely remain un-
known. However, it does not stretch the imagination too far to envision a
legislature motivated by such ideas. Indeed, although they affect both
nonresident citizen dependents and nonresident alien dependents, statutes
which restrict a class of beneficiaries based upon residency would appear
to fall disproportionately upon those dependents whose loved ones left
their homes abroad to come and work in Washington. 10 6
c. Lack of Distinction Between Nonresident and Resident Parents
Leaving aside the issue of nonresident dependent siblings, there is
no valid reason for distinguishing between resident parents and nonresi-
dent parents. The Washington child-death statute allows for recovery by
parents for the death of a child without any regard to the residency of the
parent. As noted above, this statute somewhat mirrors the wrongful death
statute, although the types of damages permitted by the two statutes may
sometimes differ. However, the types of recovery available have nothing
to do with the residency of the parents. Therefore, no valid justification
exists that would allow nonresident parents to recover under the child
death statute but not the wrongful death statute. If the damages are simi-
lar, or identical in some cases, and resident parents can elect under which
statute to bring a claim, there is little practical difference between the
wrongful death and child-death statutes when it comes to the residency
of the parents. Given that concerns about residency are not sufficient to
deny recovery to parents under the child-death statute, any justifications
for distinguishing between nonresident parents and resident parents in
the ordinary wrongful death and survival statutes is unconvincing.
d Similar Legislative Changes to Workers' Compensation Statutes
Lastly, in 1997, the Washington legislature amended the workers'
compensation statutes that deal with beneficiaries to end discrimination
against nonresident alien beneficiaries with regard to death benefits.10 7
Prior to the amendments, nonresident aliens were only entitled to fifty
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Beth Lyon, & Rebecca Smith, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Amicus Curiae Brief: The United States Violates International Law When Labor Law
Remedies Are Restricted Based on Workers' Migrant Status, I SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 795, 819
(2003) (in a discussion of state workers' compensation laws which deny death benefits to non-
resident alien beneficiaries. "Although these laws do not explicitly discriminate on the basis of
alienage alone, they disproportionately deny equal benefits to non-nationals, who are most likely to
have beneficiaries who are non-resident aliens.").
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.050 (2004); Id. § 51.32.140 (2004).
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percent of the compensation awarded to resident beneficiaries.' 08 The law
now reads:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided by treaty or this title, whenever
compensation is payable to a beneficiary who is an alien not resid-
ing in the United States, the department or self-insurer, as the case
may be, shall pay the compensation to which a resident beneficiary
is entitled under this title.1 °
Even though the legislature saw fit to correct this injustice in the workers
compensation statutes, there has been no indication from the legislature
that it plans to correct the same injustice in the wrongful death and sur-
vival statutes. Thus, although there might be a valid justification for per-
mitting wrongful death recovery by parents and not siblings, the ap-
plication of the residency requirement should apply to all nonresidents,
whether they are siblings or parents.
3. The Designated Class does not Bear a Rational Relationship
to the Purpose of the Statutes
The third and final question in the rational basis analysis is whether
the class at issue bears a rational relationship to the legislation's purpose.
Here, the plaintiff must "show conclusively that the classification is con-
trary to the legislation's purposes." 110 Washington courts have deter-
mined that "the object and purpose of these statutes is to provide a rem-
edy whereby the family or relatives of the deceased, who might naturally
have expected maintenance or assistance from the deceased had he lived,
may recover compensation from the wrongdoer commensurate with the
loss sustained." '  This purpose cannot be achieved if a distinction is
drawn between residents and nonresidents.
The wrongful death and survival statutes were intended to remedy
the injustice of the common law by allowing certain family members a
right of action for the loss of a loved one. Even justifications used in
other jurisdictions, such as preventing pauperism or lack of jurisdictional
power over nonresidents, bear no relation to this stated purpose. If the
statutes had restricted recovery to dependent parents but not to siblings, it
would still be rationally related to the state's interest in compensating
those who would suffer most from the decedent's death and would typi-
108. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.140 (2005).
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.140 (2004).
110. Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wash. 2d 376, 392, 88 P.3d 939, 947 (2004) (citing Yakima
County Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 92 Wash. 2d 831, 836, 601 P.2d 936 (1979)).
111. Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash. App. 765, 771-72, 987 P.2d 127, 130 (1999) (citing Hedrick v.
liwaco Ry. &Nav. Co., 4 Wash. 400, 402-03, 30 P. 714 (1892), rev'd on other grounds, Lockhart v.
Besel, 71 Wash. 2d 112,426 P.2d 605 (1967)).
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cally have the closest relationship to him or her. The legislature is not
required to allow recovery by every possible group who might feel the
loss of a loved one. The purpose of these statutes is defeated, however,
by not permitting recovery to a select group of those who otherwise were
similarly dependent on the decedent but who happen to reside outside of
the borders of the United States. This is especially true when other simi-
larly situated parents and siblings are allowed to recover. Again, a tort-
feasor should not benefit simply because he killed a person whose de-
pendent mother happened to live 150 miles away in British Columbia
instead of across the country in Florida.
B. The Claim of Nonresident Alien Beneficiaries
is Derivative from the Decedent's Claim
Finally, the justification for allowing nonresident alien beneficiaries
to bring suit for a violation of equal protection starts with the premise
that all residents, whether aliens or not, would be entitled to bring per-
sonal injury claims if they were injured, but not killed, inside Washing-
ton borders. By extension, a claim for wrongful death which includes the
pre-death injuries of the decedent is actually the claim that the decedent
would have had if he had survived. The Washington Supreme Court
states that "equal protection requires that persons similarly situated with
respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment." 112
Therefore, by denying recovery in some wrongful death cases based on
the residency of the beneficiary, the underlying claim of the decedent is
not treated similarly to those of other decedents under the statute, that is,
those with resident beneficiaries.
In such a case it is not the nonresident alien who is being treated
unfairly but the decedent. Despite a longstanding common law principle
of actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal action dies with the
person)," 3 the purpose of the survival statutes is to remedy the common
law problem of barring claims if the tort victim dies but allowing them if
he survives."14 Therefore, barring claims by nonresident dependents is
contrary to the intent and purpose of survival statutes and once again
makes it cheaper to kill a man than to injure him.
The primary question is whether the beneficiaries' claims are de-
rivative of the decedent's claim. As noted above, the survival statutes,
whether general or special, limit recovery to the two tiers of beneficiaries
112. State v. Simmons, 152 Wash. 2d. 450,458, 98 P.3d 789, 793 (2004).
113. Gray v. Goodson, 61 Wash. 2d 319, 324, 378 P.2d 413, 416 (1963).
114. Otani v. Broudy, 151 Wash. 2d 750, 755, 92 P.3d 192, 194 (2004).
[Vol. 29:663
Denial of Recovery to Nonresident Beneficiaries
listed in the statutes." 5 Both the courts and the legislature in Washington
have made it clear that the survival statutes are to compensate for injuries
personal to the decedent, since the injuries suffered by beneficiaries are
otherwise covered by the wrongful death statutes.' 16 In 1993, the general
survival statute was amended by the legislature to allow the decedent's
estate to recover for pain and suffering "personal to and suffered by a
deceased" on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries.'7 Although this shows
the legislature's intent to limit such recovery to the beneficiaries, it is
evidence that the claim for injuries is personal to the decedent.
In addition, the courts have noted that Washington's survival statute
does not create a new claim for the survivors, but preserves all causes of
action that a decedent could have brought if he or she had survived." 8
Such causes of action are also subject to defenses such as the decedent's
own negligence. 1 9 It follows that if the decedent has no cause of action,
neither do his beneficiaries. Again, this shows that a claim under the sur-
vival statute is brought on behalf of the decedent, not his beneficiaries.
In the context of workers compensation claims, other state courts
have held that restricting the class of beneficiaries is a violation of equal
protection. In Kansas and Florida, the courts have determined that the
beneficiaries' claims are derivative of the decedent's claim; thus, any
discrimination against certain beneficiaries is tantamount to discrimina-
tion against the decedent himself.1 20 In Jurado v. Popejoy Construction,
the Kansas Supreme Court stated that "[a]ll considerations focus upon
the employee and the rights and laws preexisting the employee's death,
and we therefore conclude that it is entirely appropriate to approach a
determination of constitutionality upon our consideration of the constitu-
tional rights of the employee, now deceased.",12' The statute in Jurado
differs from the present one in that it was limited to excluding only non-
resident alien beneficiaries and did not exclude nonresident United States
citizens, whom the Washington statutes do exclude. Thus, the court
found that such a classification was based upon the alienage of a resi-
dent's dependents and should therefore be subject to a strict scrutiny
115. See supra text accompanying note 49; Tail, 97 Wash. App. at 769, 987 P.2d at 129 ("Like
Washington's wrongful death statute ... RCW 4.20.060 is expressly limited to the two tiers of bene-
ficiaries listed in RCW 4.20.020.").
116. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.046 (2004); Otani, 151 Wash. 2d at 761-63, 92 P.3d at
197-98; Tait, 97 Wash. App. at 774, 987 P.2d at 132 (1999).
117. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046 (2004).
118. Otani, 151 Wash. 2d at 755-56, 92 P.3d at 195; see also Cavazos v. Franklin, 73 Wash.
App. 116, 118, 867 P.2d 674, 676 (1994).
119. See Ginochio v. Hesston Corp., 46 Wash. App. 843, 845, 733 P.2d 551, 552 (1987).
120. De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204 (Fla. La. Weekly, 1989);
Jurado v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993).
121. 853 P.2d at 675.
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analysis, since such an impermissible classification affected the equal
protection rights of the employee and not the beneficiaries. 22 However,
such an approach is still applicable to Washington survival statutes. As
noted above, the survival statutes in Washington focus on the pre-death
rights of the decedent; therefore, it is reasonable to rule on the constitu-
tionality of these statutes based upon the decedent's rights.
In a Florida case, De Ayala v. Florida Farm Bureau, the court used
similar logic for finding such classifications impermissible. 123 The De
Ayala court noted the following:
The law did not afford petitioner's deceased husband different
treatment while he was alive and working . . . [c]ommon sense dic-
tates that he should be entitled to the same "benefits," regardless of
the residence or status of his dependents. 124
Again, in the workers' compensation context, the "benefits" referred to
by the De Ayala court are the "satisfaction and well-being of providing
for his or her family."'125 Although the wrongful death or survival statutes
were not necessarily intended to reward the decedent for his hard work
and contribution to his employer, they were intended, in the words of the
Washington Supreme Court, to provide a remedy "whereby the family or
relatives of the deceased, who might naturally have expected mainte-
nance or assistance from the deceased, had he lived, may recover com-
pensation from the wrongdoer commensurate with the loss sustained.' 26
While no state courts have come to the conclusion that a claim under a
survival statute is derivative, Washington courts should follow the ap-
proach used in Kansas and Florida and find that, at the very least, non-
resident aliens, as distinguished from nonresident citizens, should be al-
lowed to bring an equal protection challenge to the survival statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is true that courts must be very careful about treading too far into
the legislature's waters. However, an important element of our governing
system of checks and balances is for the courts to ensure that the legisla-
ture does not overstep its bounds and violate either federal or state con-
stitutional principles. Our courts must never forget that "[t]he ultimate
122. Id. at 676. This Comment addresses the constitutionality question using a rational basis
analysis, not a strict scrutiny analysis.
123. 543 So. 2d 204.
124. Id. at 207.
125. Id.
126. Whittlesey v. City of Seattle, 49 Wash. 645, 648, 163 P. 193, 194 (1917).
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power to interpret, construe, and enforce the constitution of this State
belongs to the judiciary. 12 7
After almost a century of denying recovery to dependent parents
and siblings solely because they happen to live either next door in Can-
ada or in another foreign country, it is time to recognize that such a dis-
tinction is outdated. Indeed, the courts in our state recognized this injus-
tice before the legislature even amended the statutes. In 1908, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court took what was then a nonspecific wrongful death
statute, at least as applied to nonresidents, and interpreted it to provide
nonresident aliens with a cause of action.' 28 As the court noted, "the rule
which permits nonresident aliens to maintain actions of this kind [wrong-
ful death] ... is more in harmony with the liberal cosmopolitan spirit of
the age than the narrow provincial rule which would close our courts to
widows and orphans solely because they happen to be nonresident
aliens." 129 Less than a year later, the legislature decided to close our
courts to nonresidents whose loved ones were killed in our state by a
wrongful, tortious act.
In the end, the wrongful death cause of action stems from the tor-
tious act of the defendant, not the entitlement to recovery by a certain
class of persons. Therefore, a wrongful act should not go unremedied
merely because of the residency of the decedent's beneficiary. It is time
that Washington courts remember the words of Justice Rudkin in Anusta-
sakas v. International Contract Co.,' 30 and move to bring Washington
into harmony with the liberal cosmopolitan spirit of the age by striking
down these statutes as unconstitutional.
127. Wash. State Labor Council v. Reed, 149 Wash. 2d 48, 62, 65 P.3d 1203, 1211 (2003).
128. Anustasakas v. Int'l Contract Co., 51 Wash. 119, 120-22, 98 P. 93, 94-95 (1908).
129. Id. at 123, 98 P. at 94.
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